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RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM 
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Dr. W. Wesley Pue∗ 
 
Peter Russell, widely known for his scholarship on constitutional matters, is one of Canada’s 
pre-eminent political scientists. He has been an active participant in Canadian constitutional debates, a 
pioneering “law and society” scholar, a founding figure and early President of the Canadian Law and 
Society Association. His contributions to scholarly culture, to Canadian public discourse, and to 
academic publishing are legion.1 
His newest book takes us to another country on a distant continent and to a new series of issues. 
Recognizing Aboriginal Title: The Mabo Case and Indigenous Resistance to English-Settler 
Colonialism2 is a remarkable work which canvasses the history of Aborigine-settler relations in 
Australia from first European contact to the early twenty-first century. Its focal point is the surprising 
High Court of Australia decision in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2)3 in which an indigenous Australian 
sought to establish his legal ownership of family lands in the face of seemingly unshakeable Australian 
legal doctrine. The legal fiction by which the entire country was deemed to have been terra nullius at 
the time of its discovery by Europeans made Mr. Mabo’s course challenging. Australian legal experts 
had long assumed that Australia’s first peoples, unlike colonized indigenous peoples of Africa, Asia, or 
North America, could hold no “traditional” title to lands. Overturning fiction long fossilized into legal 
doctrine took some doing, and the book is dedicated “In memory of Eddie Koiki Maba, a shit disturber 
par excellence”. 
Russell’s explanation as to how he turned from scholarship on “high” constitutionalism to work 
on the nitty-gritty of a particular British-based constitutional system is a salutary tale, part 
methodological explanation, part theoretical insight and part mea culpa: 
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 (1992), 175 C.L.R. 168 (H.C.A.) [Mabo]. 
As a decision on common law native title, the Mabo case did not, on its face, seem to be 
of constitutional significance. If I did not include it among the Australian constitutional 
developments I needed to examine, however, I would be perpetuating the narrow 
understanding of constitutional politics that had characterized my earlier work.4 
 
But for the guidance of Jillian Evans, who maintained a press-clippings room at the Australian National 
University’s Research School of Social Sciences, he might have missed the significance of Mabo – 
clearly the “big” story of Australian constitutionalism in these years – entirely. After more than three 
decades of research on the failure of “grandiose projects of constitutional renewal”, Russell came to 
perceive that 
 
… the formal, written Constitution is only one of the components of a constitutional 
system. The other components are political practices and conventions – organic statutes 
that, even though they are not formally part of the “written” Constitution, define some 
of a country’s governing institutions – and, finally but by no means least, judicial 
decisions interpreting and developing the Constitution. I had come to appreciate that it 
is through these various components of the constitutional system, including the 
occasional amendment of the formal Constitution, that constitutional systems adapt and 
evolve. Seen in this light, Mabo might well have constitutional significance.5 
 
Indeed. 
Mabo changed Australian constitutionalism, politics, and law profoundly. The interplay of law, 
politics, constitutionalism, and history presented in Recognizing Aboriginal Title is subtle, nuanced and 
thorough. Russell, in fact, presents five books in one. It includes an important historical interpretation 
of European colonialism’s main streams of thought, apologetics and self-critiques, and also provides a 
first class historical account of the workings-out of imperialist ideology through colonial law and 
policy regulating relations with indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States, the four principle British settler-colonies. Third, the work provides an assessment of recent 
developments in International Law relating to indigenous peoples, including their human rights and 
sovereignty. Fourth, it offers an extended theoretical contribution through a critique of unreflective 
legal positivism combined with a clear sighted realism as to the limited potential of litigation to effect 
significant social change. This is, in part, a repudiation of the sort of popular “black letter” 
constitutionalism that informs “One Nation” ideology in Australia, Reform Party understandings of 
First Nations issues in Canada, and most mysteriously of all, Republican Party approaches to the U.S. 
Constitution grounded in ‘original intent’. Finally, of course, the book provides an account of the 
remarkable accomplishments of an individual who changed history: “Eddie Koiki Mabo, a Merian man 
of the Pladarim clan, pearler, long-time exile, cane-cutter, dock-worker, loving husband, father and 
grandfather, school founder, community activist, university groundsman, researcher and lecturer, 
champion of Indigenous culture, and a courageous, indefatigable, but mortal litigator … an Australian 
hero.”6 
The book is exhaustively researched presenting a remarkable synthesis and interpretation of 
diverse literatures. Its sweep makes it indispensable for those researching constitutionalism or 
aboriginal issues in any of Canada, the United States, New Zealand or Australia, as well as for anyone 
with historical interests in either British Imperial law or international law relating to colonialism. The 
                                                 
4
 Recognizing Aboriginal Title, supra note 2 at 5. 
5
 Ibid. at 6. 
6
 Ibid. at 312. 
five streams are woven into a tightly integrated, beautifully written, engaging, carefully conceived and 
persuasive whole, making it a “must-read” well beyond narrow circles of subject-matter specialists.  
These seemingly diverse spatial, political, and intellectual threads come together in the person 
of Eddie Mabo and his struggle to prove title to land inherited under the laws of his peoples. Mabo was 
raised in a traditional community on the Island of Mer (also known as Murray Island), one of the 
Torres Strait Islands. The islands lie north of Australia, off Queensland’s Cape York, in waters 
separating Papua New Guinea from mainland Australia.7 It was only as an adult who had already 
established himself as an aboriginal activist that Mabo discovered the full extent of his dispossession 
under Australian law. Russell describes a meeting at James Cook University “some time around 1974” 
between historians Noel Loos and Henry Reynolds and Mabo, then a groundskeeper employed as a 
research assistant: 
 
Mabo talked about land that still belonged to him on Murray Island and his 
determination to return to it. At this point, Loos and Reynolds exchanged glances and 
tried to explain gently to Mabo that, because the land belonged to the Crown, he was 
probably mistaken about his land ownership. To demonstrate the point, they took down 
an old Queensland map and showed him that his island, like all the Torres Strait Islands, 
was marked “Aboriginal Reserve”. Loos recalls that Mabo exploded at this explanation. 
“I’d like to see someone take my land away from me,” he screamed at them.8 
 
One might have thought that Mabo’s attempt to establish the legal entitlement of Meriam 
people to ownership of their land unproblematic. Their mode of land use and ownership was easily 
cognizable to European eyes. Under their own customary mechanisms of recognition and transmission 
established under “Malo Law” property was divided into “garden plots and fish traps”.9 Even the forms 
and processes of Malo Law were easily recognizable as such by Europeans, for they produced a sort of 
“Oral Register of Title” not entirely unlike medieval customary landholdings in the United Kingdom.10 
Moreover, Mabo’s claim was of a sort that had in fact been formally recognized during the history of 
colonial governance in the region. The entire Malo system had been incorporated in Queensland law 
through the work of the state’s “Murray Island Native Court”, which had produced a remarkable record 
of dispute resolution seemingly confirming the existence of “native” title in the Islands. The Court 
Book recorded “many cases over a period of eighty years in which the Island Court, authorized by 
Queensland law, settled disputes according to the traditional system of land tenure”.11 
Nonetheless, a peculiar Australian alchemy of colonial fantasy suffused legal doctrine to such 
an extent that it was to take fully 10 years to establish the principle that there might be such a thing as 
“native title” on the island. Australia’s founding ideology, grounded in a strong version of the terra 
nullius mythology, gave way only reluctantly to observable fact, past state practice, and the internal 
logic of British imperial law. Mabo’s stubborn insistence that Australian courts should look to lived 
experience, history, and past state practices in order to correct an abstract, erroneous, but firmly 
entrenched legal doctrine forms the heart of this book. Russell traces out the various legal and political 
encounters along the way, as well as the follow-up to the High Court of Australia’s decision 
(particularly in the Wik case12) and the political whirl-wind it brought forth.  
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The story is, in part, an edifying tale of heroic, individual, human agency. Eddie Mabo appears 
as the principle hero, but there are others. Historian Henry Reynolds, surely the most important socio-
legal scholar to emerge from Australia during the twentieth century, looms large, too. So do others. The 
remarkable barrister, Barbara Hocking is credited as “the intellectual architect of the Mabo case”.13 
“Much against the advice of her supervisor,” Hocking had completed a master’s thesis “on the 
recognition of original native title by the colonial powers of Europe”.14 This work became central to the 
legal arguments that eventually prevailed. The book is not just about heroic figures, however. It is also 
a story about remarkable collective action by less celebrated Aboriginal peoples, of positive 
developments in the courts and of developments in the international arena. Undoubtably, a form of 
justice was worked in Mabo. Beneficial results flowed for Australia’s indigenous peoples. Legal action, 
at least in the right “conjuncture”, worked for the good. 
Peter Russell, however, does not naïvely leave things here. “Judges,” he points out, “have no 
power to enforce their decisions. However revolutionary a judicial decision may be on paper, the 
changes it effects in the real world depend on how the political system as a whole responds to it.”15 The 
larger question of the practical outcomes of this heroic tale takes us into Australia’s collective psyche, 
epitomized in the personality of the country’s tremendously popular Prime Minister, John Howard. 
Howard, it turns out, announced his intentions early in a speech which “virtually amounted to a 
declaration of war on Indigenous peoples’ rights.”16 Though remarkably similar to positions advanced 
by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and Cabinet Minister Jean Chretien in the 1960s, Prime 
Minister Howard’s understandings find little contemporary resonance in international law, 
historiography, or the common law of the former British Empire. The inappropriateness of gauging 
aboriginal peoples’ entitlements only on the scales of “citizenship” or “minority rights” was 
dramatically revealed to a mass Canadian readership over thirty-five years ago through the remarkable 
work of the Cree leader and scholar Harold Cardinal. Whatever its problems, Canadian public policy 
has never returned to those starting points.17 The possibility of starting from a position that recognizes 
the “firstness” of First Peoples remains mysterious to many Australians, including their governing 
party. 
In other respects, however, the two countries apparently move in tandem. Russell’s assertion 
that “Australian judges seem to be whittling native title down to ‘a bundle of rights’ – rights to carry on 
specific traditional activities – rather than a controlling interest in their traditional country” applies 
holus bolus in Canada, as demonstrated in R. v. Joshua Bernard,18 denying an aboriginal entitlement to 
logging as an incident of Mi’kmaq treaty rights. 
Aboriginal politics in Australia, like the kindred “history wars”19 are fought with a peculiar 
intensity, ferocity, and at a pace seldom seen in Canada. Change can come at stunning speed, especially 
if measured on the glacial scale of movement to which Canadian observers of aboriginal policy have 
become accustomed. To take but one example, the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islanders Commission, 
which Peter Russell describes in hopeful terms throughout the book,20 was abolished between the time 
of writing and publication.21 It is impossible to be fully up to date.  
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Where the future will lead remains unclear: as the book clearly illustrates, the interplay of law 
and politics is complex, multi-leveled and unpredictable.  
 
